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# How are the Children of Visible Minority Immigrants Doing in the Canadian Labour Market?

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#### **Abstract:**

This paper examines the performance of the children of immigrants (2<sup>nd</sup> generation immigrants) to Canada using data from the 2006 Census. As the composition of immigration inflows has shifted after 1980 from the traditional European source countries to the Third World, the analysis focuses on the labour market performance of 2<sup>nd</sup> generation visible minority immigrants of whom there were 398 thousand aged15 and over who reported employment income in the Census.

An encouraging fact revealed by the data is that  $2^{nd}$  generation visible minority immigrants are becoming more highly educated than  $2^{nd}$  generation non-visible minority immigrants and than non-immigrants -46.2 per cent of  $2^{nd}$  generation visible minority between 25 and 44 earning employment had earned university certificates or degrees compared to 31 per cent of non-visible minority  $2^{nd}$  generation immigrants and 24 per cent of non-immigrants in the same age groups.

But, while  $2^{nd}$  generation visible minority immigrants obtained more education than  $2^{nd}$  generation non-visible minority immigrants and non-immigrants, their performance as a group did not measure up in the labour market. In the 25 to 44 age group, accounting for the largest number of  $2^{nd}$  generation visible minority immigrants, they only earned on average \$39,814, whereas  $2^{nd}$  generation non-visible minority immigrants earned \$45,352 and non-immigrants 40,358.

The labour market performance varies significantly among different visible minority groups. 2<sup>nd</sup> generation Chinese immigrants in the 25 to 44 age group actually earned \$48,098, which was actually more than 2<sup>nd</sup> generation non-visible minority immigrants and non-immigrants. Because of the large number of Chinese included as 2<sup>nd</sup> generation immigrants, this buoyed up the overall average and masked the unfortunate fact that many other visible minority groups are doing much worse than average overall and falling short of non-immigrants.

A troubling aspect of the performance of 2<sup>nd</sup> generation immigrants, except for Chinese and Japanese, is the extent to which they earn substantially less than non-immigrants and especially non-visible minority immigrants for any given level of education.

The paper thus provides no grounds for complacency that the children of the recent, particularly non-Asian visible minority, immigrants who are performing so poorly in Canada's labour market will catch up with non-immigrant groups, particularly given that their parents are currently performing much worse than earlier visible minority immigrants in the labour market. And it is unlikely that 2<sup>nd</sup> generation visible minority immigrants as a group will earn enough to make up for the current earnings shortfall experienced by their parents in recent cohorts of underperforming immigrants.

Furthermore, the lower earnings of many visible minority groups for any given level of education are likely to continue be used as justification for more affirmative action programs. This will adversely affect the non-visible minority and non-immigrant population, and could become a source of increasing social tension.

**JEL Classification Codes:** J23 – Labour demand; J24 – Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labour Productivity; J61 – Geographic mobility, immigrant workers.

**Keywords:** wages, 2<sup>nd</sup> generation immigrants to Canada, immigration policy, human capital

#### Introduction

A series of Statistics Canada studies (Picot, 2008; Picot and Sweetman, 2005; Picot and Hou, 2008) has highlighted the poor and deteriorating performance of recent immigrants in labour markets and the resulting growth of poverty among immigrants. These adverse trends combined with the progressive social benefits offered by the Canadian welfare state call into question the economic benefits to Canada that are supposed to come from an open immigration policy that admits among the highest levels of new immigrants per capita in the industrialized world.

The most plausible defence of continued high mass immigration in the face of the emergence of these unpleasant facts is that, while it is undeniable that recent immigrants are not doing very well, their children and grandchildren born and educated in Canada will make it in the Canadian labour market and do as well as or better than other Canadians. And this has generally been the case in past periods when Canada has absorbed large numbers of new immigrants.

Nevertheless, everyone must admit that it is not easy to predict how the children of immigrants, let alone their grandchildren, will do based on the past experience of immigrants. After the 1980s, the source of Canada's immigration shifted from the traditional countries of Western and Eastern Europe to the Third World. The largest portion of the new immigrants started to come from Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America, which are regions of the world with cultures, languages and religions that are quite different from the majority of Canadians of European background. And most of the new immigrants can be classified as visible minorities. Based on their experience once in Canada, these groups have been judged to have unique challenges competing in Canadian labour markets. In recognition, Canadian governments have introduced affirmative action programs, which are called "employment equity" programs in Canada.

As visible minorities are expected to continue to be the largest source of new immigrants to Canada, it is important to look at how their children born in Canada (2<sup>nd</sup> generation immigrants) are doing in the Canadian labour market as measured by their average employment incomes. And as immigrants from different countries and regions are doing quite differently in the labour market, it is also useful to consider the different performance of the children of those from these different places (at least to the extent that it is possible using the published data on the employment income of 2<sup>nd</sup> generation immigrants from different source regions from the 2006 Census).

This study consequently examines the average education levels and incomes of three groups of people:  $2^{nd}$  generation visible minority immigrants (defined as those so classifying themselves in the 2006 Census as visible minority and as children of immigrants),  $2^{nd}$  generation non-visible minority immigrants (similarly defined as those so classifying themselves), and non-immigrants (defined as those born in Canada, which also includes as a small portion  $2^{nd}$  generation immigrants).

#### The Evidence

Statistics Canada has posted tabulations of the data on the employment statistics by geography, work activity status, generation status, visible minority status, age group, education, and sex by from the 2006 Census. These data are taken from the 20-per-cent Census sample and include the numbers in the groups, and their median employment income and average employment income reported for 2005. The analysis presented here uses the data on average employment income for total work activity including both part-time and full time. For purposes of analysis, it is broken down by educational level, visible minority group, age group, and gender. A caveat is in order. The categories for visible minority are unfortunately very aggregative and are not necessarily indicative of ethnic origin, but they are all that is available in the free published data tabulations.

#### The Number of 2<sup>nd</sup> Generation Immigrants

The number of 2<sup>nd</sup> generation visible minority immigrants 15 and over reporting employment income is not yet a large proportion of the total Canadian population (Table 1A). But it still totals 398 thousand, which should be large enough to provide an idea of how the children of visible minority immigrants born in Canada are doing in the labour market. However, the numbers are much smaller for 2<sup>nd</sup> generation immigrants aged 25 and over. This is the group who should have completed their education and joined the labour force in a fully trained capacity (only 186 thousand between 25 and 44 years of age and 20 thousand between 45 and 64 Table 1B). This is because the large inflow of visible minority immigrants is only a post-1980 phenomenon and many years are required before their children can take their full place in the Canadian labour market. The numbers also become even smaller when they are broken down by gender into men and women (Table 1C) and when they are further disaggregated by visible minority class (based on country or region, or skin colour). This leaves many cells in the tables with few observations and limits the extent to which it is possible to draw firm conclusions about some aspects of the labour market performance of 2<sup>nd</sup> generation immigrants.

#### **Educational Attainment**

An encouraging fact revealed by the data is that  $2^{nd}$  generation visible minority immigrants are becoming more highly educated than  $2^{nd}$  generation non-visible minority immigrants and than non-immigrants – 46.2 per cent of  $2^{nd}$  generation visible minority between 25 and 44 earning employment income had earned university certificates or degrees compared to 31 per cent of non-visible minority  $2^{nd}$  generation immigrants and 24 per cent of non-immigrants in the same age groups (Table 2B). Moreover, some  $2^{nd}$  generation visible minority immigrants are getting much more education than others – 64 per cent of  $2^{nd}$  generation Korean immigrants between 25 and 44 have a university degree or certificate, 60.3 per cent of Chinese, 56.8 per cent of West Asians, 52.2 per cent of South Asians, and 47.7 per cent of Japanese.

The same holds true for advanced degrees -13.5 per cent of  $2^{nd}$  generation visible minority between 25 and 44 earning employment had earned university certificates, diplomas or degrees above the bachelor's compared to 9.5 per cent of non-visible minority  $2^{nd}$  generation immigrants and 6.9 per cent of non-immigrants in the same age

groups (Table 2B). Again the educational attainment of some groups stand out -20.8 per cent of Koreans in the 25-to-44 age group have more than a bachelor's degree, 18.9 per cent of South Asians, 15.6 per cent of Chinese, and 14.5 per cent of Southeast Asians. These relatively high levels of educational achievement might reflect the high value traditionally put on education by these cultures.

On the other hand, there are some visible minority groups of 2<sup>nd</sup> generation immigrants that are getting significantly less education than non-visible minority and non-immigrants groups. Only 11.3 per cent of Latin Americans, 17.2 per cent of Southeast Asians and 19.7 per cent of Blacks earned university certificates or degrees. And only 5.4 per cent of Latin Americans, 6.7 per cent of Filipinos had university certificates, diplomas or degrees above the bachelor's.

Interestingly, the level of education of women  $2^{nd}$  generation visible minority immigrants was even higher than men as it also was for  $2^{nd}$  generation non-visible minority immigrants and non-immigrants, which as a category also includes  $2^{nd}$  generation immigrants (Table 2C).

#### Average Employment Earnings

While 2<sup>nd</sup> generation visible minority immigrants obtained more education than 2<sup>nd</sup> generation non-visible minority immigrants and non-immigrants, their performance as a group in aggregate comes up slightly short in the labour market. In the 25-to-44 age group, accounting for the largest number of 2nd generation visible minority immigrants, they only earned on average \$39,814, whereas 2<sup>nd</sup> generation non-visible minority immigrants earned \$45,352 and non-immigrants \$40,358 (Table 3B).<sup>3</sup> And in the 45-to-64 age group, 2<sup>nd</sup> generation visible minority immigrants earned \$49,460 less than the \$53,778 for 2<sup>nd</sup> generation non-visible minority immigrants, but more than the \$47,016 earned by non-immigrants. However, it would be misleading to make too much of this difference as the results are only for a relatively small number of individuals who are predominantly of Chinese, and Japanese origin.

The labour market performance varies significantly among visible minority groups. 2<sup>nd</sup> generation Chinese immigrants in the 25-to-44 age group actually earned \$48,098, which was more than 2<sup>nd</sup> generation non-visible minority immigrants and non-immigrants. Because of the large number of Chinese included as 2<sup>nd</sup> generation visible minority immigrants, this buoyed the overall average. Other smaller visible minority groups in the 25-to-44 age group that outperformed non-immigrants, but not 2<sup>nd</sup> generation non-visible minority immigrants, were Japanese (\$45,028), Korean (\$42,143), and South Asian (\$40,717). Arabs, many of whom were Lebanese, earned \$39,511 or about average. On the other hand, Blacks (\$34,631) and Latin Americans (\$31,468) experienced the largest earnings shortfalls in average employment earnings amounting to 22 and 19 per cent respectively.

While 2<sup>nd</sup> generation visible minority women earn substantially less than men, they do better than men relative to non-immigrants (Table 3C).

A troubling aspect of the performance of 2<sup>nd</sup> generation immigrants, except for Chinese and Japanese, is the extent to which they earn substantially less than non-immigrants and especially non-visible minority immigrants for any given educational level. Some will undoubtedly be inclined to attribute these differences in labour market performance to discrimination. To make a convincing case, they will have to explain why only some visible minority groups are the victims of discrimination and not others. Nevertheless, this will not stop them from using the lower earnings of visible minorities as a justification to put more pressure on governments to strengthen affirmative action programs. The downside of this is, of course, that such programs will have an adverse affect on the employment prospects of those who are not visible minorities, thus encouraging increased social conflict, especially between visible minorities and nativeborn Canadians.

Another cause for concern is that the current labour market performance of 2<sup>nd</sup> generation visible minority immigrants may not be a reliable indicator of the labour market performance of 2<sup>nd</sup> generation visible minority immigrants in the future. The reason this might be the case is that the current group of 2<sup>nd</sup> generation visible minority immigrants of prime labour force age are the children of cohorts of visible minority immigrants who came to Canada in much smaller numbers than are being admitted currently before immigration was liberalized and who were able to perform much better in the labour market than the post-1990 cohorts for whom the earnings deterioration was observed to be most marked.<sup>4</sup>

The current poor performance of visible minority immigrants in the labour market is likely to lead to future problems because there is evidence that the income of parents can adversely affect the incomes of children. For instance, Burton and Phipps (2009, p.4-5) have found that children coming from low- income families exhibited considerable "stickiness" of position in the income distribution and that this was exacerbated by being "non-white" as are the greater majority of recent immigrants. And immigrants coming to Canada during the current period of high unemployment could suffer from "scarring" and have the long term prospects of themselves and even their children damaged.

#### **Conclusions**

The good news from the 2006 Census is that the Canadian-born children of some visible minority immigrants, particularly Koreans, Chinese and West Asians, are getting more education than non-visible minority 2<sup>nd</sup> generation immigrants and non-immigrants.

The evidence from the 2006 Census, however, provides no grounds for complacency that the children of the recent non-Asian visible minority immigrants who are performing so poorly in Canada's labour market will catch up with non-immigrant groups in their earnings, or do as well as the descendants of non-visible minority immigrants who are still continuing to out-earn non-immigrant groups. This is because of the relatively poor performance of particular visible minority groups and because of the risk that the poor economic performance of the current cohort of visible minority immigrants who will be the parents of future 2<sup>nd</sup> generation visible minority immigrants will compromise the future educational attainments of their descendants.

The main premise underlying Canada's open immigration policy, namely that immigrants, or at least their children, regardless of where they come from in the world, will eventually perform economically as well as everybody else with respect to their earnings, is thus at this point very much still open to question.

The incomes earned by immigrants and their children are the most important indicator of the success of Canada's immigration policy. These incomes equal their direct contribution to output as well as their claim on output. The incomes of non-immigrants are not affected directly by the immigrants' participation in the economy. However, because of the progressive income tax system and the universality of social benefits in Canada's welfare state, immigrants and their children with below average incomes impose a fiscal burden on existing Canadian residents while those with above average incomes provide a fiscal benefit. To truly provide a net fiscal benefit to Canada from a continuation of high levels of immigration, the children of the current cohort of immigrants will need to earn enough to pay through taxation for the government pension and health programs required to take care of their parents after retirement. And this will likely be very costly indeed as these parents are expected to have low market income after retirement because of the impact of their current low earnings and abbreviated work lives resulting from their late arrival to Canada on their future retirement pensions and savings.

Considered in the light of this analysis, the findings of this paper suggest that it is unlikely that Canada's current immigration policy, if maintained, will be a source of net fiscal benefits in the future, but rather that it is more likely that it will be a continuing source of fiscal burden.

And it is unfortunate that the lower earnings of many visible minority groups for any given level of education will likely give rise to social tensions. Differences in earnings will be held up as indicators of discrimination that can only be countered through the introduction of more and strengthened affirmative action programs. And, if affirmative action is viewed as reverse discrimination, the non-visible minority population, including non-immigrants, who are adversely affected, can be expected to be resentful, particularly after having welcomed so many visible minority immigrants into the country.

#### **Footnotes**

- 1. The relevant web page for the tabulations can be found at <a href="http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2006/dp-pd/tbt/Rp-eng.cfm?TABID=1&LANG=E&APATH=3&DETAIL=0&DIM=0&FL=A&FREE=0&GC=0&GK=0&GRP=1&PID=96280&PRID=0&PTYPE=88971,97154&S=0&SHOWALL=0&SUB=0&Temporal=2006&THEME=72&VID=0&VNAMEE=&VNAMEF=</a>
- 2. A finer breakdown by source country is provided in the 2006 Census Public Use Microdata File (PUMF). However, it is not a very reliable source of information on the employment income of 2<sup>nd</sup> generation visible minority immigrants because it only incorporates a sample of 2.7 per cent of the Canadian population, which is much smaller than the 20 per cent sample used in the tabulations used here.
- 3. There is a question if the results for the 25 to 44 age group could be distorted by the age composition of the different three groups in the overall category. For instance, if the visible minority 2<sup>nd</sup> generation immigrants were on average younger than the non-visible minority 2<sup>nd</sup> generation immigrants, then their earnings level could be lower because the had less experience and were not a far advanced in their careers. Unfortunately, the earnings data from the 20 per cent sample is only published for the whole 25 to 44 age group and not be any subgroups that would shed light on the question. To answer this question, it would be necessary to have access to the full 20 per cent sample and not just the tabulations.
- 4. The data and some analysis of the poor labour market of recent immigrants by country or region of origin are presented in Grady (2010).

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Table 1A: Numbers of Individuals 15 Years and Over Reporting Average Employment Income in 2005

	Certificate or Diploma below Bachelors	University Certificate or Degree	Bachelor's Degree	University Certificate, Diploma or Degree Above Bachelors	Total
2nd Generation Immigrants Total Age Groups		•	-		
Chinese	61,880	41,775	31,895	9,880	103,655
South Asian <sup>1</sup>	66,460	30,995	21,075	9,920	97,460
Black	65,590	16,140	11,930	4,210	81,735
Filipino	21,530	6,285	5,200	1,085	27,815
Latin American	13,065	1,670	1,295	375	14,735
Southeast Asian <sup>2</sup>	11,995	2,505	1,840	665	14,505
Arab	10,695	3,570	2,475	1,090	14,265
West Asian <sup>3</sup>	2,020	790	545	na	2,805
Korean	3,890	3,020	2,145	880	6,910
Japanese	7,125	3,505	2,475	1,025	10,635
Visible Minority n.i.e	6,690	1,735	1,315	415	8,430
Multiple Visible					
Minority <sup>4</sup>	10,990	3,880	2,855	1,025	14,870
Total Visible Minority	281,930	115,870	85,050	30,820	397,805
Not a Visible Minority	1,831,750	582,375	383,450	198,925	2,414,130
Total Non -			4 000 -00	0-40-0	
Immigrant	11,594,450	2,684,055	1,829,780	854,270	14,278,500

#### Notes:

- 1. South Asian includes, for example, 'East Indian', 'Pakistani', 'Sri Lankan', etc.
- 2. Southeast Asian includes, for example, 'Vietnamese', 'Cambodian', 'Malaysian', 'Laotian', etc.
- 3. West Asian includes, for example, 'Iranian', 'Afghan', etc.
- 4. Multiple visible minority includes respondents who reported more than one visible minority group by checking two or more mark-in circles, e.g., 'Black' and 'South Asian'.

Table 1B: Numbers of Individuals 15 Years and Over Reporting Average Employment Income in 2005 by Age Group

				University Certificate,	
	Certificate	11-2		Diploma or	
	or Diploma below	University Certificate	Bachelor's	Degree Above	
	Bachelors	or Degree	Degree	Bachelors	Total
2nd Generation					
Immigrants 25 to 44 Years					
Chinese	19,460	29,520	21,880	7,640	48,980
South Asian	21,715	23,730	15,140	8,590	45,445
Black	28,635	13,010	9,395	3,615	41,650
Filipino	8,760	4,905	3,960	945	13,665
Latin American	4,405	1,330	1,015	310	5,735
Southeast Asian	2,025	1,540	1,025	515	3,560
Arab	4,235	2,625	1,745	880	6,860
West Asian	400	525	330	0	925
Korean	1,385	2,465	1,665	800	3,850
Japanese	2,195	2,000	1,480	520	4,195
Visible Minority n.i.e	3,230	1,390	1,020	365	4,620
Multiple Visible Minority	3,815	2,965	2,105	860	6,785
Total Visible Minority	100,270	86,005	60,765	25,235	186,270
Not a Visible Minority	727,730	324,240	224,185	100,055	1,051,970
Total Non - Immigrant	4,501,695	1,453,075	1,041,885	411,190	5,954,770
2nd Generation					
Immigrants 45 to 64					
Years					
Chinese	6,060	4,420	3,040	1,380	10,480
South Asian	1,355	410	na	na	1,765
Black	2,535	545	350	na	3,080
Filipino	na	na	na	na	na
Latin American	260	na	na	na	320
Southeast Asian	na	na	na	na	na
Arab	440	na	na	na	630
West Asian	na	na	na	na	na
Korean	na	na	na	na	na
Japanese	1,825	770	490	285	2,600
Visible Minority n.i.e	na	na	na	na	na
Multiple Visible Minority	na	na	na	na	290
Total Visible Minority <sup>1</sup>	13,310	6,680	4,425	2,255	19,990
Not a Visible Minority	605,340	191,650	112,585	79,060	796,990
Total Non - Immigrant	4,139,270	946,530	570,800	375,725	5,085,800

Notes:

1. Total Visible Minority is less than the sum of categories because some of data is not provided.

Table 1C: Numbers of Individuals 15 Years and Over Reporting Average Employment Income in 2005 by Gender

	Certificate or Diploma below	University Certificate	Bachelor's	University Certificate, Diploma or Degree Above	
	Bachelors	or Degree	Degree	<b>Bachelors</b>	Total
2nd Generation					
Immigrants Men					
Chinese	33,300	20,420	15,385	5,040	53,725
South Asian	35,785	14,090	9,615	4,480	49,875
Black	34,030	5,865	4,355	1,510	39,890
Filipino	11,410	2,605	2,170	435	14,015
Latin American	6,690	670	540	na	7,360
Southeast Asian	6,040	1,095	810	285	7,140
Arab	5,715	1,760	1,175	590	7,480
West Asian	965	360	275	na	1,330
Korean	2,145	1,295	945	350	3,440
Japanese	4,020	1,800	1,245	550	5,820
Visible Minority n.i.e	3,565	610	460	na	4,175
Multiple Visible Minority	5,370	1,665	1,200	460	7,035
Total Visible Minority	149,045	52,240	38,175	14,065	201,290
Not a Visible Minority	975,530	283,240	182,310	100,930	1,258,770
Total Non - Immigrant	6,155,710	1,268,530	838,725	429,805	7,424,245
2nd Generation					
Immigrants Women					
Chinese	28,580	21,350	16,505	4,840	49,925
South Asian	30,680	16,900	11,465	5,440	47,580
Black	31,560	10,275	7,575	2,700	41,840
Filipino	10,115	3,680	3,030	650	13,795
Latin American	6,375	1,000	750	250	7,375
Southeast Asian	5,955	1,410	1,030	380	7,360
Arab	4,980	1,810	1,300	500	6,785
West Asian	1,055	425	275	na	1,480
Korean	1,745	1,725	1,200	525	3,470
Japanese	3,105	1,705	1,230	475	4,810
Visible Minority n.i.e	3,120	1,125	855	270	4,250
Multiple Visible Minority	5,615	2,215	1,650	565	7,835
Total Visible Minority	132,885	63,625	46,875	16,750	196,515
Not a Visible Minority	856,225	299,135	201,135	98,000	1,155,360
Total Non - Immigrant	5,438,740	1,415,520	991,055	424,465	6,854,260

Table 2A: Distribution of Numbers Reporting Average Employment Income in 2005 by Education (%)

	Certificate or Diploma below Bachelors	University Certificate or Degree	Bachelor's Degree	University Certificate, Diploma or Degree Above Bachelors	Total
2nd Generation					
Immigrants Total Age					
Groups	50.7	40.0	20.0	0.5	400.0
Chinese	59.7	40.3	30.8	9.5	100.0
South Asian	68.2	31.8	21.6	10.2	100.0
Black	80.2	19.7	14.6	5.2	100.0
Filipino	77.4	22.6	18.7	3.9	100.0
Latin American	88.7	11.3	8.8	2.5	100.0
Southeast Asian	82.7	17.3	12.7	4.6	100.0
Arab	75.0	25.0	17.4	7.6	100.0
West Asian	72.0	28.2	19.4	na	100.0
Korean	56.3	43.7	31.0	12.7	100.0
Japanese	67.0	33.0	23.3	9.6	100.0
Visible Minority n.i.e	79.4	20.6	15.6	4.9	100.0
Multiple Visible Minority	73.9	26.1	19.2	6.9	100.0
Total Visible Minority	70.9	29.1	21.4	7.7	100.0
Not a Visible Minority	75.9	24.1	15.9	8.2	100.0
Total Non - Immigrant	81.2	18.8	12.8	6.0	100.0

Table 2B: Distribution of Numbers Reporting Average Employment Income in 2005 by Education and Age Group (%)

	Certificate or	University		University Certificate, Diploma	
	Diploma below Bachelors	University Certificate or Degree	Bachelor's Degree	or Degree Above Bachelors	Total
2nd Generation Immigrants 25 to 44 Years					
Chinese	39.7	60.3	44.7	15.6	100.0
South Asian	47.8	52.2	33.3	18.9	100.0
Black	68.8	31.2	22.6	8.7	100.0
Filipino	64.1	35.9	29.0	6.9	100.0
Latin American	76.8	23.2	17.7	5.4	100.0
Southeast Asian	56.9	43.3	28.8	14.5	100.0
Arab	61.7	38.3	25.4	12.8	100.0
West Asian	43.2	56.8	35.7	na	100.0
Korean	36.0	64.0	43.2	20.8	100.0
Japanese	52.3	47.7	35.3	12.4	100.0
Visible Minority n.i.e	69.9	30.1	22.1	7.9	100.0
Multiple Visible Minority	56.2	43.7	31.0	12.7	100.0
Total Visible Minority	53.8	46.2	32.6	13.5	100.0
Not a Visible Minority	69.2	30.8	21.3	9.5	100.0
Total Non - Immigrant	75.6	24.4	17.5	6.9	100.0
2nd Generation Immigrants 45 to 64 Years					
Chinese	57.8	42.2	29.0	13.2	100.0
South Asian	76.8	23.2	na	na	100.0
Black	82.3	17.7	11.4	na	100.0
Filipino	na	na	na	na	na
Latin American	81.3	na	na	na	100.0
Southeast Asian	na	na	na	na	na
Arab	69.8	na	na	na	100.0
West Asian	na	na	na	na	na
Korean	na	na	na	na	na
Japanese	70.2	29.6	18.8	11.0	100.0
Visible Minority n.i.e	na	na	na	na	na
Multiple Visible Minority	na	na	na	na	na
Total Visible Minority	66.6	33.4	22.1	11.3	100.0
Not a Visible Minority	76.0	24.0	14.1	9.9	100.0
Total Non - Immigrant	81.4	18.6	11.2	7.4	100.0

Table 2C: Distribution of Numbers Reporting Average Employment Income in 2005 by Education and Gender (%)

	Certificate			University Certificate,	
	or			Diploma	
	Diploma	University		or Degree	
	below	Certificate	Bachelor's	Above	
	Bachelors	or Degree	Degree	Bachelors	Total
2nd Generation					
Immigrants Men					4000
Chinese	62.0	38.0	28.6	9.4	100.0
South Asian	71.7	28.3	19.3	9.0	100.0
Black	85.3	14.7	10.9	3.8	100.0
Filipino	81.4	18.6	15.5	3.1	100.0
Latin American	90.9	9.1	7.3	na	100.0
Southeast Asian	84.6	15.3	11.3	4.0	100.0
Arab	76.4	23.5	15.7	7.9	100.0
West Asian	72.6	27.1	20.7	na	100.0
Korean	62.4	37.6	27.5	10.2	100.0
Japanese	69.1	30.9	21.4	9.5	100.0
Visible Minority n.i.e	85.4	14.6	11.0	na	100.0
Multiple Visible Minority	76.3	23.7	17.1	6.5	100.0
Total Visible Minority	74.0	26.0	19.0	7.0	100.0
Not a Visible Minority	77.5	22.5	14.5	8.0	100.0
Total Non - Immigrant	82.9	17.1	11.3	5.8	100.0
2nd Generation					
Immigrants Women		40.0	20.4	. –	4000
Chinese	57.2	42.8	33.1	9.7	100.0
South Asian	64.5	35.5	24.1	11.4	100.0
Black	75.4	24.6	18.1	6.5	100.0
Filipino	73.3	26.7	22.0	4.7	100.0
Latin American	86.4	13.6	10.2	3.4	100.0
Southeast Asian	80.9	19.2	14.0	5.2	100.0
Arab	73.4	26.7	19.2	7.4	100.0
West Asian	71.3	28.7	18.6	na	100.0
Korean	50.3	49.7	34.6	15.1	100.0
Japanese	64.6	35.4	25.6	9.9	100.0
Visible Minority n.i.e	73.4	26.5	20.1	6.4	100.0
Multiple Visible Minority	71.7	28.3	21.1	7.2	100.0
Total Visible Minority	67.6	32.4	23.9	8.5	100.0
Not a Visible Minority	74.1	25.9	17.4	8.5	100.0
Total Non - Immigrant	79.3	20.7	14.5	6.2	100.0

Table 3A: Average Employment Income in 2005 (\$)

2nd Generation Immigrants Total Age	Certificate or Diploma below Bachelors	University Certificate or Degree	Bachelor's Degree	University Certificate, Diploma or Degree Above Bachelors	Total
Groups					
Chinese	21,545	50,505	45,602	66,334	33,216
South Asian	17,495	41,861	36,849	52,510	25,245
Black	18,582	38,676	35,975	46,331	22,550
Filipino	18,896	36,084	35,147	40,569	22,781
Latin American	16,705	33,144	31,326	39,343	18,568
Southeast Asian	12,750	34,294	30,408	45,092	16,474
Arab	19,932	45,436	44,221	48,185	26,314
West Asian	15,359	36,785	33,418	na	21,371
Korean	17,494	41,489	38,934	47,736	27,984
Japanese	27,568	52,610	46,539	67,263	35,826
Visible Minority n.i.e	20,948	42,979	36,860	62,447	25,481
Multiple Visible Minority	17,448	42,599	38,465	54,108	24,010
Total Visible Minority	18,917	44,364	40,263	55,680	26,329
Not a Visible Minority	33,314	64,527	58,756	75,651	40,844
Total Non - Immigrant	30,720	61,237	55,384	73,775	36,457

Table 3B: Average Employment Income in 2005 by Age Group (\$)

	Certificate			University Certificate,	
	or Dinloma	Haireanitre		Diploma	
	Diploma below	University Certificate	Bachelor's	or Degree Above	
01.0	Bachelors	or Degree	Degree	Bachelors	Total
2nd Generation Immigrants 25 to 44					
Years					
Chinese	37,336	55,193	51,906	64,608	48,098
South Asian	32,299	48,419	44,534	55,268	40,717
Black	28,214	42,895	40,616	48,820	32,801
Filipino	30,818	41,437	40,764	44,262	34,631
Latin American	29,751	37,151	35,746	41,734	31,468
Southeast Asian	27,314	43,527	39,558	51,438	34,317
Arab	32,103	51,463	52,740	48,935	39,511
West Asian	28,882	44,222	39,831	na	37,569
Korean	33,917	46,767	46,021	48,318	42,143
Japanese	36,493	54,404	52,814	58,919	45,028
Visible Minority n.i.e	31,528	47,870	41,193	66,658	36,438
Multiple Visible Minority	30,736	47,253	44,427	54,165	37,956
Total Visible Minority	31,776	49,358	46,498	56,245	39,894
Not a Visible Minority	39,018	59,570	55,734	68,163	45,352
Total Non - Immigrant	35,150	56,492	52,587	66,388	40,358
2nd Generation					
Immigrants 45 to 64					
Years					
Chinese	47,713	74,797	66,112	93,941	59,138
South Asian	42,383	93,481	na	na	54,318
Black	37,159	55,489	51,149	na	40,424
Filipino	na	na	na	na	na
Latin American	51,383	na	na	na	48,342
Southeast Asian	na	na	na	na	na
Arab	38,344	na	na	na	49,252
West Asian	na	na	na	na	na
Korean	na	na	na	na	na
Japanese	41,852	74,625	56,800	105,270	51,579
Visible Minority n.i.e	na	na	na	na	na
Multiple Visible Minority	na	na	na	na	82,606
Total Visible Minority <sup>1</sup>	43,617	75,045	63,433	97,844	49,460
Not a Visible Minority	43,678	85,680	78,532	95,857	53,778
Total Non - Immigrant	39,459	80,065	74,055	89,194	47,016

#### Note:

1. Multiple Visible Minority is a very small group for the 45 to 64 age group and its total is unduly influenced by some very high values. The median is \$41,978, which is half the mean.

Table 3C: Average Employment Income in 2005 by Gender (\$)

	Certificate or Diploma below	University Certificate	Bachelor's	University Certificate, Diploma or Degree Above	Takal
and Concretion	Bachelors	or Degree	Degree	Bachelors	Total
2nd Generation Immigrants Men					
Chinese	23,867	58,745	51,732	80,165	37,126
South Asian	19,425	49,474	42,604	64,214	27,916
Black	20,264	44,365	41,705	52,052	23,808
Filipino	20,360	38,338	36,239	48,726	23,702
Latin American	19,837	36,234	34,678	na	21,328
Southeast Asian	13,800	35,984	31,754	48,050	17,207
Arab	23,475	57,956	58,717	56,442	31,604
West Asian	17,805	38,373	32,701	na	23,400
Korean	19,769	51,959	47,652	63,521	31,893
Japanese	32,002	64,895	55,218	86,730	42,176
Visible Minority n.i.e	24,026	58,111	44,438	na	28,980
Multiple Visible Minority	19,699	51,838	46,509	65,744	27,299
Total Visible Minority	21,080	52,495	46,583	68,542	29,234
Not a Visible Minority	39,897	82,960	75,970	95,585	49,587
Total Non - Immigrant	36,946	78,673	71,565	92,544	44,076
2nd Generation					
Immigrants Women					
Chinese	18,839	42,623	39,889	51,943	29,009
South Asian	15,244	35,514	32,023	42,870	22,445
Black	16,768	35,429	32,680	43,137	21,351
Filipino	17,245	34,489	34,366	35,067	21,845
Latin American	13,417	31,078	28,910	37,573	15,814
Southeast Asian	11,683	32,980	29,350	42,868	15,763
Arab	15,867	33,225	31,167	38,541	20,488
West Asian	13,111	35,438	34,131	na	19,548
Korean	14,698	33,623	32,072	37,166	24,107
Japanese	21,830	39,647	37,749	44,575	28,146
Visible Minority n.i.e	17,431	34,832	32,777	41,363	22,044
Multiple Visible Minority	15,296	35,663	32,609	44,603	21,057
Total Visible Minority	16,491	37,687	35,116	44,881	23,354
Not a Visible Minority	25,814	47,073	43,152	55,120	31,318
Total Non - Immigrant	23,673	45,612	41,690	54,770	28,204